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1. Introduction  
In recent literature, the agency view of the firm has been dominated by the finding of 
La Porta et al. (1999) that throughout the world, firm control is typically concentrated in the 
hands of a few shareholders. Such shareholders tend to maintain control with a relatively 
small fraction of cash-flow rights. In such a controlling minority structure (CMS)1, 
controlling shareholders are able to extract private benefits to the detriment of minority 
shareholders, who incur most of the implied agency costs. Hence, the relevant agency 
problem in CMS firms is between controlling shareholders and minority investors (type II 
agency problem), rather than the one between managers and all shareholders (type I agency 
problem) as suggested by Berle and Means (1932). The corporate governance literature 
documents that the likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders often increases 
with the control–ownership wedge. However, little is known about the expropriation activities 
in these firms. The present research explores this area by focusing on corporate cash holdings, 
a typical channel for extracting private rents in CMS firms. 
Prior research on capital structure indicates that firms prefer using internally generated 
funds at the first-best level to undertake valuable investment opportunities since external 
financing usually entails additional costs due to asymmetric information as well as transaction 
costs (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Opler et al. (1999) argue that the level of cash holdings a 
firm maintains arises as a trade-off between the costs and benefits of keeping liquid assets 
within the firm. Hoarding cash provides a buffer against unexpected liquidity shocks and 
avoids the transaction costs of raising external funds (Kim et al. (1998)). The availability of 
huge amounts of cash can, however, provide insiders with strong incentives to siphon off 
these resources to restock themselves, especially in the context of weak investor protection. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) point out that important cash holdings are ubiquitous in countries with 
                                                             
1 The term controlling minority structure was initially coined by Bebchuk et al. (2000). 
3 
 
poor investor protection, irrespective of ease of access to their capital markets. Harford et 
al. (2008) consistently show that cash exceeding optimal levels leads to inefficient capital 
investment and less valuable firms when internal governance mechanisms are not sufficiently 
effective to preserve shareholders’ interests. In the same vein, Yun (2009) finds that cash 
holdings tend to increase relative to lines of credit when the market for corporate control does 
not effectively carry out its disciplinary role. 
To the extent that agency problems affect corporate cash holding decisions, the value 
that investors assign to cash may depend on the firm’s quality of corporate governance. 
Building on this reasoning, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 
acknowledge that minority shareholders respond to high expropriation risk by discounting the 
value of cash holdings in countries with poor investor protection. Similarly, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that well-governed firms exhibit a higher value of cash holdings 
than poorly governed ones. Analyzing diversification strategies, Tong (2011) shows that, 
compared to stand-alone firms, investors assign a lower value to cash holdings in diversified 
firms due to substantial agency problems in conglomerates. Studying payout methods, Haw et 
al. (2011) show that, in countries with weak investor protection, resorting to stock repurchases 
contributes less to cash value than paying out dividends. They conclude that payouts via 
repurchases are less effective than payouts via dividends in alleviating the agency costs of 
free cash flow. 
The present research extends the literature on the effects of corporate governance on 
cash holdings by examining how investors value excess cash held by CMS firms. We 
particularly address the following questions: Does the separation of control and cash-flow 
rights reduce the contribution of excess cash to firm value (i.e., the value of excess cash)? Do 
independent boards constrain the use of cash in CMS firms? We suggest that cash that 
exceeds a firm’s needs facilitates self-serving activities, especially when large shareholders 
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enjoy more control rights relative to their cash-flow rights. We hence posit that investors’ 
concerns about the use of such abnormally large cash stockpiles should be reflected in a lower 
value of the generated excess cash in CMS firms. 
 Severe agency problems arising from the control–ownership wedge make the role of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms, notably boards of directors, more important in 
curbing the opportunistic use of excess cash by controlling shareholders. Board independence 
is, in particular, considered to be essential to ensure high-quality governance. Researchers and 
practitioners consider that effective boards are those including independent members, who are 
deemed to act in the best interests of shareholders by providing active monitoring of 
managerial actions (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)). 
Moreover, there is strong evidence that separating the chief executive officer (CEO) and chair 
positions indicates more effective board monitoring, since boards are deemed to exert more 
independent oversight over management when they are chaired by a person who is not 
involved in these managerial tasks (e.g., Daily and Dalton (1997); Bliss (2011)).2  
Moreover, the various laws and corporate governance guidelines—including the 
Cadbury report (1992) in the United Kingdom, the Viénot reports (1995; 1998) and the 
Bouton report (2002) in France—are being constantly reviewed to promote greater board 
independence. The Viénot report (1995), for instance, recommends the appointment of at least 
two independent board members whereas the 1998 revised version of this report requires a 
minimum of one-third of independent directors on boards. The Bouton report (2002) calls for 
raising this proportion to a half of board members. Nonetheless, board effectiveness in firms 
with concentrated control remains questionable, given that large entrenched shareholders 
                                                             
2 We refer to the combined role of CEO and chair as a dual leadership structure or CEO duality. 
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often tighten their control over firm resources by holding top executive positions or serving 
on boards (Faccio and Lang (2002); Anderson and Reeb (2004)). 
In this paper, we address the question of whether boards of directors effectively carry 
out their governance role in CMS firms. More specifically, we investigate whether boards of 
directors affect the value of excess cash held by CMS firms by analyzing the effect of board 
independence and the separation of CEO and chair positions on the relation between control–
ownership wedge and the value of excess cash. 
We tackle these issues within the French context, where laws are less protective of 
outside investors and not well enforced as documented by La Porta et al. (1998) and control is 
typically concentrated through the use of a variety of control-enhancing mechanisms (Faccio 
and Lang (2002) and Boubaker (2007)). In such an environment, agency problems between 
controlling and minority shareholders (type II agency problem) can be important, which is 
potentially reflected in the valuation of excess cash holdings. 
Our research extends existing studies in several ways. First, several studies including 
Harford (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) examine the 
effects of agency relations on corporate cash policies. Our work provides new insights into 
the agency costs of cash by examining agency problems associated with the separation of 
control and cash-flow rights and the governance role of board independence. This study is 
among the first to focus on the management of cash policy in a context characterized by a 
large presence of dominant shareholders having control in excess of ownership. The role of 
boards of directors in shaping firms’ cash policies in such a setting is also not yet explored in 
the prior literature.  
Second, unlike existing relevant research linking ownership structure to the value of 
cash holdings, this study examines the issue in light of type II agency problems induced by 
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the control–ownership wedge. For example, using a broad cross-country sample, Kalcheva 
and Lins (2007) conclude that the concentration of control rights in managers’ hands 
negatively affects the value of firms with important levels of cash holdings. The authors do 
not, however, explore the effect of the deviation of control rights from cash-flow rights for 
managers because of data limitations. 3 Kusnadi (2011) examines the effects of corporate 
governance on the market value of cash held by Singaporean and Malaysian firms without 
considering the implications of separating of control and cash-flow rights. Our work takes the 
control–ownership wedge of the controlling shareholders into account in gauging the severity 
of agency problems in CMS firms. We conduct a within-country analysis that overcomes the 
limitations of cross-country studies by taking advantage of a homogeneous cultural, legal, 
judicial, and economic environment, as argued by Bushman and Smith (2001). This study also 
adds to Masulis et al.'s (2009) work, which finds that insiders (i.e., officers and directors) 
holding more votes than equity rights significantly influences investment strategy, CEO 
compensation, and cash policy of U.S. dual-class firms. In a marked contrast to their study, 
we focus on type II agency problems, whereas they examine type I agency problems. 
Third, despite the importance of corporate governance in a concentrated control 
setting, the role of boards of directors in CMS firms remains underexplored. Effective 
monitoring by independent boards can, in particular, be jeopardized by the power of 
controlling shareholders to appoint and replace board directors. To the best of our knowledge, 
our study is the first to investigate board effectiveness regarding the value of cash holdings in 
firms featuring an important separation of control and cash-flow rights and evolving in a weak 
legal investor protection environment. 
                                                             
3 The authors use samples of Western European firms, emerging market firms, and East Asian firms 
from the datasets of Faccio and Lang (2002), Lins (2003), and Claessens et al. (2000), respectively, 
where cash flow rights are computed differently for each dataset. 
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Fourth, we extend the corporate finance literature by examining the implications of 
agency problems on cash holdings as a key financial policy. Hoarding cash is, indeed, 
predominantly ascribed to the transaction cost motive and/or the precautionary motive 
(Keynes (1936); Myers and Majluf (1984)). Our research provides original evidence on the 
prevalence of the agency motive behind excessive amounts of corporate cash holdings in the 
specific case of CMS firms. French firms are interesting objects of study in this regard, given 
that they have relatively high cash-to-net assets ratios, as documented by Dittmar et 
al. (2003). Controlling shareholders are hence provided with more opportunities to consume 
private benefits, notably through cash diversion. 
Using a sample of 1901 firm–year observations of 398 publicly traded French firms 
during 2002–2007, we find that control-ownership wedge detrimentally affects the 
contribution of cash to firm value. More specifically, results indicate that the value of excess 
cash declines by about 87% at high levels of separation of control and cash-flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder. We further provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of 
boards of directors in monitoring managerial actions tends to reduce the propensity of 
controlling shareholders for cash expropriation in CMS firms. We mainly find that the 
negative effect of control–ownership wedge is less pronounced in firms with independent 
boards than in their counterparts with non-independent boards. Results show that investors 
place a less substantial discount on the value of excess cash associated with a high control–
ownership wedge in firms whose boards have a large number of independent members or a 
non-dual leadership structure.  
Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that a substantial separation of control 
and cash-flow rights leads to a considerable decline in the value of excess cash that reflects 
the concern of minority investors about the way controlling shareholders use corporate cash 
holdings. Our findings also show that effective boards of directors contribute in reducing the 
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discount of the value of cash in CMS firms in the presence of independent boards and when 
the CEO is not the chairman of the board. 
 
In sum, our findings support the argument that minority shareholders associate the 
inefficient use of excess cash to the ability of controlling shareholders to entrench themselves 
when their control rights exceed their cash-flow rights. Independent boards seem to play a 
disciplinary role in such instances by reducing investors’ concerns about the misuse of cash 
holdings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
context governing the ownership and control in France. Section 3 motivates and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 5 provides 
descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports the results of the multivariate analysis. Finally, 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The institutional context 
Unlike the U.S., France has a civil-law legal tradition that is deemed to provide little 
protection to minority investors and poor law enforcement (La Porta et al. (1998)). Corporate 
ownership is widely diffused in the U.S. while it is typically concentrated in the hands of few 
dominant shareholders holding relatively small ownership stakes in France as in many other 
continental European countries (Faccio and Lang (2002)). This situation allows controlling 
shareholders to exert substantial control over firms while having much lower equity stakes, 
resulting in CMSs. CMSs are ubiquitous in France where firms are allowed to adopt a variety 
of ownership arrangements that lead to significant divergence between control and cash-flow 
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rights (e.g., non-traded double voting shares and traded non-voting shares such as preferred 
shares and investment certificates).  
The separation of control and cash-flow rights is achieved differently in France than in 
other countries. First, despite the fact that the French law allows companies to issue a second 
class of non-voting shares, there are only very few firms that have adopted this type of share 
ownership (Faccio and Lang (2002)). Besides, these non-voting shares do constitute only a 
small part of the overall ownership of these firms.4 Second, the French law allows firms to 
grant their faithful shareholders a second vote when they hold a registered stock beyond a 
given period. These double voting shares are a French specificity since they are not traded and 
are deprived from the second vote when they are sold.5 Third, it is common, in France, that 
the controlling shareholder wields control over an entity through a cascade of several listed 
and unlisted intermediate firms, i.e. pyramiding. Boubaker (2007) consistently documents that 
one-third of publicly listed French firms are controlled through pyramiding and that control-
ownership wedge inherent to this ownership structure is substantial. Fourth, more than 75% of 
French firms are controlled by families and nearly two-third of these firms have members of 
the controlling family among the top management team, which ostensibly reinforces their 
control (Faccio and Lang (2002)). This specific framework makes it interesting to study the 
agency implications of the separation of control and cash- flow rights in French listed firms. 
                                                             
4 Examples of these firms are Bouygues, Casino Guichard, Essilor, Legrand, L’Oreal, Pechiney, 
Sagem and Société du Louvre 
5 The French law does not allow the creation of other types of dual-class shares rather than non-voting 
shares what it does exist in other European countries such as Sweden or Denmark where issuing 
multiple-class shares is possible. Hence, double voting shares cannot be considered as a second class 
of shares.  
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The legal context in France is also viewed as an environment that provides controlling 
shareholders with considerable opportunities for the occurrence of large related-party 
transactions (Djankov et al. (2008)). For example, the French legislation authorizes related-
party transactions without the requirement of shareholders’ approval when they are achieved 
under “normal” conditions, which increases the discretionary latitude of the controlling 
parties. France receives, indeed, the weak score of 0.38 of the anti-self-dealing index 
developed by Djankov et al. (2008), indicating that its legal system is prone to self-dealing 
transactions and indulgence in abuse of private benefits of control.6 
Taken together, all these characteristics distinguish the French corporate environment 
from that of the U.S. and the U.K, and provide a unique setting for the analysis of agency 
costs incurred in CMS firms generating large cash balances.  
3. Hypotheses development 
a. Control–ownership  wedge and the value of cash holdings 
The presence of large shareholders mitigates the traditional agency problem between 
owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). When such shareholders gain nearly full 
control of a firm, they tend, however, to expropriate minority shareholders and to consume 
private benefits at the cost of reduced firm value (Grossman and Hart (1988); Harris and 
Raviv (1988)). Accordingly, larger control-ownership wedge in CMS firms is often associated 
with greater expropriation by controlling shareholders, leading to severe agency costs (e.g., 
Claessens et al. (2002); Boubaker and Labégorre (2008); Hughes (2009); Boubaker et al. 
(2014)). In this vein, Burkart and Lee (2008) emphasize that separating control and ownership 
in dual-class firms deters hostile takeovers, which reduces the exposure of controlling 
                                                             
6 The anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008) ranges from zero to one, decreasing 
as the likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders increases.  
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shareholders to market discipline. Villalonga and Amit (2009) contend that firms are more 
likely to adopt a dual-class structure when the private benefits of control are relatively high 
and expropriation costs are low. More importantly, large shareholders of CMS firms have 
increased opportunities to expropriate resources that are easily diverted, such as cash 
holdings. That is, cash in excess of what is required for profitable projects can exacerbate 
agency costs unless firms disgorge it through dividends or share repurchases (Jensen (1986); 
Stulz (1990)). Entrenched controlling shareholders tend then to retain large cash holdings to 
divert these away from productive usage, especially since the abundance of cash allows 
greater freedom and less scrutiny from capital markets. In this line of reasoning, multiple 
studies (e.g., Blanchard (1994); Harford (1999); Harford et al. (2008)) highlight that cash-rich 
firms prefer to dissipate cash through value-decreasing projects so that they can prevent future 
payout commitments and divert the attention of potential raiders. 
A high control–ownership wedge coupled with weak corporate governance often gives 
controlling shareholders important incentives and discretion to divert cash from CMS firms 
for their own benefit. The absence of profitable investment opportunities further increases the 
likelihood that controlling shareholders squander cash in empire building, negative net present 
value pet projects, excessive perquisites, and fringe benefits, thus deteriorating future firm 
profitability (Jensen (1986)). Inefficiency in the use of cash potentially incites minority 
shareholders to discount the value of cash holdings, particularly when investor protection is 
weak (Pinkowitz et al. (2006); Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)). In this line, Kalcheva and 
Lins (2007) find that the concentration of managers’ control rights negatively affects the 
value of cash holdings and that this effect is more pronounced in countries with weak investor 
protection. Masulis et al. (2009) underline that insiders in U.S. dual-class firms 
opportunistically convert cash for private consumption, making cash less valuable to 
investors. Jiang et al. (2011) argue that separating control and cash-flow rights is conducive to 
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substantial monitoring costs by outsiders leading to sub-optimal investments and reduced 
learning from the stock market. 
The presence of complex ownership structures are particularly reputed to intensify 
agency problems arising from control-ownership wedge (La Porta et al. (1999); Claessens et 
al. (2000)). For instance, controlling shareholders −located at the apex of complex ownership 
structures− often hold smaller cash-flow rights in lower-tier firms, which may give them 
incentives to internally relocate resources to higher-tier entities, where they have greater 
ownership interests (Bebchuk et al. (2000)). Accordingly, higher control–ownership wedge is 
conducive to tunneling activities in these structures, including through related-party 
transactions (Johnson et al. (2000)). Pinkowitz et al. (2006) argue that tunneling through cash 
transfer is particularly easy that controlling shareholders prefer to keep funds in liquid assets 
at the cost of reduced value of cash holdings. Likewise, the complexity of some ownership 
structures makes it extremely difficult for minority shareholders to assess cash expropriation 
risk, which may lower the value of corporate cash holdings.7  
The above arguments advocate that cash holdings in CMS firms are expected to be 
less valuable to outsiders in the presence of high separation of control and cash-flow rights. 
Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis. 
H1: The value of excess cash decreases as the separation of control and cash-flow 
rights of the controlling shareholder increases. 
                                                             
7 Outside shareholders may face difficulties in determining the identity and interests of controlling 
entities due to the opacity of some complex ownership structures such as sprawling pyramids and 
multiple control chains.  
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b. Control–ownership wedge, independent directors, and value of cash holdings 
Conventional wisdom advocates that independent directors, − as opposed to directors 
who have personal or professional ties with firms’ controlling shareholders (or managers) − 
are the most likely to provide active monitoring (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990); Adams et al. (2010)). The importance of the role of independent members on 
boards is basically ascribed to the lack of need or incentive to collude with management or to 
stay in its good graces. Independent board members are, instead, more willing to perform 
their fiduciary duties to develop their “reputational” capital as professional monitors, 
particularly when the labor market for outside directors is well functioning (Fama and Jensen 
(1983)). 
As effective monitors, independent directors are expected to limit agency costs and 
safeguard minority shareholders’ interests against the abuse of controlling parties and their 
tendency to consume private benefits (Raheja (2005)).8 More interestingly, Dahya et 
al. (2008) stress that independent boards can provide more valuable monitoring in an 
environment that is highly conducive to self-dealing activities than in a context of strong 
investor protection, where the likelihood of expropriation is already low. For this purpose, 
many board interventions are regulated by legal provisions, such as those on related-party 
transactions, executive compensation, and disclosure practices.9 Enriques and Volpin (2007) 
                                                             
8 There is evidence from Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) in the United Kingdom and Harford et al. (2008) in 
the United States that board independence does not influence cash holdings in strong investor 
protection environments. 
9 French commercial law stipulates a special regime for related-party transactions involving 
executives, directors, and controlling shareholders holding more than 10% of voting rights. When such 
transactions are not qualified as routine, they must first be approved by the board of directors and then 
ratified by an ordinary shareholders’ meeting. In practice, the interpretation of routine transactions is 
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consistently argue that these legal requirements are prone to exacerbate the costs of 
opportunistic wealth transfers, including those involving the diversion of firm cash resources.  
Prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. (2007)) show that the appointment of independent 
directors per se is less likely in an environment where investor protection is weak and control 
is concentrated, as in France. One likely explanation is that controlling shareholders tend to 
reinforce their entrenchment by hiring more representatives on boards, enabling them to have 
authority over management, strategic operations, and voting agendas (Anderson and 
Reeb (2004). The existence of control-enhancing mechanisms as dual-class shares makes it 
easier for controlling shareholders to dominate the board, which reduces its independence 
(Villalonga and Amit (2009)). More broadly, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) argue that firms where 
control rights exceed cash-flow rights are less likely to include independent members on their 
boards of directors, hence exacerbating agency costs. 
A wide range of studies on board structure provide strong evidence that the presence 
of more independent directors in firms with concentrated control is associated with lower 
agency costs. Board independence is shown to be important in enhancing firm value (e.g., 
Yeh and Woidtke (2005)), lessening earnings management (Jaggi et al. (2009)), improving 
earnings informativeness (Firth et al. (2007)), and increasing voluntary disclosure (Patelli and 
Prencipe (2007)).  
A testable implication is that independent directors mitigate the agency costs 
associated with cash holding, given that entrenched controlling shareholders are less inclined 
to use excessive cash reserves in private rent-seeking activities in the presence of effective 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
subject to great debate: Enriques and Volpin (2007) contend that “judges and practitioners have 
traditionally provided a mild interpretation of this regime; for example, by classifying most 
transactions with companies of a same group as routine.”  
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boards of directors. In other words, to the extent that the value of cash holdings decreases as 
the control–ownership wedge increases, we expect this value discount to be lower in the 
presence of a higher proportion of independent board directors. In light of this analysis, we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
H2: The negative association between a control–ownership wedge and the value of 
excess cash is less pronounced in the presence of a higher proportion of independent 
directors. 
c. Control–ownership wedge, separation of CEO and chair positions, and value 
of cash holdings 
Consistent with agency theory, combining management and monitoring activities is 
deemed to compromise the quality of corporate governance (Fama and Jensen (1983)). Most 
notably, the ability of boards to monitor CEO decisions tends to diminish in dual leadership 
firms. Central to this thesis is the fact that the CEO–chair of the board is increasingly able to 
dominate other board directors by capitalizing on specific knowledge and refraining from 
providing directors with the information necessary to effectively carry out their duties 
(Brickley et al. (1997)). The dominance of the CEO–chair can also be reinforced by his/her 
capability to influence the process of selecting and replacing board members (Dayton (1984)). 
As a result, CEO duality leadership typically jeopardizes board independence, thereby 
weakening its disciplinary role (Bliss (2011)). The CEO–chair hence has more opportunities 
to engage in opportunistic behavior while being insulated from effective board monitoring 
(Daily and Dalton (1997)). 
The existing literature has advanced the importance of agency problems stemming 
from combined CEO–chair positions. Gul and Leung (2004) show that CEOs who jointly 
serve as board chairs are vested with the broadest powers and are hence less likely to adopt a 
voluntary disclosure policy. Chang and Sun (2009) argue that the market seems to perceive 
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CEO duality as impeding the monitoring of accounting quality, which lowers the stock price 
informativeness of earnings. Bliss et al. (2011) find that audit fees are deemed higher in firms 
where CEOs are also the chair of the boards due to their potentially important audit risk. 
Examining corporate diversification strategies, Kim et al. (2009) show that firms with CEO 
duality are the most likely to engage in value-destroying unrelated diversification. 
The separation of the CEO and chair positions is considered a key element in 
increasing the accountability of directors to shareholders. It is more commonplace nowadays 
than it was a decade ago, thanks to codes of best practice for corporate governance. In this 
regard, Grinstein and Valles (2008) show that the number of cases in which firms opt to 
separate the CEO and chair roles is increasing, particularly because of pressure exerted by 
investors. As far as the separation of CEO and chair positions being associated with lower 
agency costs, we posit that controlling shareholders of firms with a non-dual leadership 
structure have fewer opportunities to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. We thus 
expect investors to be less concerned about the potential misappropriations of cash build up in 
CMS firms where the CEO is not also the chair of the board. Based on this analysis, we 
suggest that the decline in the value of cash caused by a substantial control–ownership wedge 
should be less severe in dual leadership firms. Therefore, we state our third hypothesis as 
follows. 
H3: The negative association between control–ownership wedge and the value of 
excess cash is less pronounced when there is a separation of the CEO and chair 
positions. 
4. Data and methodology 
This section first describes the sample selection procedure and data sources. It then 
presents the approach adopted to gauge the wedge between the ultimate control and cash-flow 
17 
 
rights of the controlling shareholder. Next, it describes the methodology applied to compute 
excess cash holdings. Finally, it specifies the empirical model used to test research 
hypotheses. 
a. Sample selection procedure and data sources 
We initially consider all French listed firms on the Euronext over the period 2002–
2007. We delete financial firms (with Standard Industrial Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–
6999) from the sample because their liquid assets are not comparable to those in other 
industries. We exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999), since their cash holdings 
are very often subject to unique regulatory requirements. We also discard observations for 
which governance or financial data are missing. We are left with 2,494 firm–year 
observations. Consistent with prior work (e.g., Drobetz et al. (2010); Frésard and 
Salva (2010)), we omit 593 observations with negative excess cash, given the absence of 
theoretical background underlying the implications of corporate governance quality in firms 
with negative excess cash.  
Our final sample consists of 1,901 firm–year observations of 398 firms covered over 
the period 2002–2007. Details on the sample selection criteria are provided in Table 1. 
Financial data are obtained from the Worldscope database. All of the variables used in the 
analysis are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to minimize the impact of outliers.  
The corporate governance data of sample firms are gathered manually from their 
annual reports available on corporate websites and/or the website of the Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers.10 
                                                             
10 The Autorité des Marchés Financiers is the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
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b. Wedge between the ultimate control and cash-flow rights of the controlling 
shareholder 
We follow the methodology of La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) to 
identify the ultimate controlling shareholders and measure their ultimate cash-flow (UCF) and 
ultimate control (UCO) rights. Control chains are computed at a 10% control threshold by 
taking into account all control-enhancing mechanisms that exist in France, namely, pyramid 
structures, non-voting shares, and double voting shares.11 
Following the widely used weakest link principle, we compute UCO as the sum of the 
weakest links along the different control chains. UCF are computed as the sum of the 
products of the direct cash-flow stakes along these chains. The wedge between ultimate 
control and cash-flow rights is measured as the ratio (UCO - UCF)/UCO. 
c. Excess cash estimation methodology 
Consistent with trade-off theory, optimal levels of corporate cash holdings result from 
the equilibrium between the costs and benefits of hoarding cash. On the one hand, firms retain 
cash to prevent shortfalls in internal financing, which is required to undertake all positive net 
present value projects. This reduces financial distress costs associated with more expensive 
external funds, that is, fulfills a precautionary motive (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Moreover, 
firms with large cash reserves are better able to make payments in cash without incurring the 
transaction costs of raising non-cash assets. Keynes (1936) refers to this cost as the 
transaction cost motive for maintaining cash reserves. On the other hand, cash stockpiles 
often generate lower return rates than do investment projects; they can also imply important 
                                                             
11 Using the 20 % thresholds does not affect our conclusions since it only slightly reduces the 
sample of controlled firms. 
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tax disadvantages, including the loss of debt tax shields and higher taxation (Opler et al. 
(1999)). 
Building on this reasoning, Opler et al. (1999) empirically estimate the optimal level 
of cash holdings for firms as a function of their ability to access the capital market (proxied 
by firm size), the severity of financial constraints (cash flow), the availability of liquid asset 
substitutes (net working capital), hedging needs (cash flow volatility), investment 
opportunities (market-to-book ratio), and financial distress costs (research and development, 
or R&D, expenses). Cash in excess of predicted levels is the residual term in the fixed-effect 
model of Opler et al. (1999), presented as  
Ln(Cash/NetAssets)i,t=β0+β1Ln(RealNetAssets)i,t+β2CashFlow/NetAssetsi,t+β3NWC/NetAsse
ti,t  
                                    +β4STD CFi+β5MarketValue/NetAssetsi,t+β6R&D-to-sales 
                                     + αi, +µt +εi,t ,                                    (Eq. (1)) 
where Ln(Cash/NetAssets) is the natural logarithm of cash to net assets, Cash is cash and 
marketable securities, and NetAssets is non-cash assets, measured as the book value of total 
assets minus cash and marketable securities. Ln(RealNetAssets) is a proxy of firm size, 
computed as  the natural logarithm of NetAssets in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the 
French consumer price index series; CashFlow is cash flow, computed as operating income 
minus interest and taxes; NWC is net working capital, computed as current assets minus 
current liabilities minus cash; STD CF is the industry average of the prior five-year standard 
deviation of cash flow to net assets, where industry is defined according to Campbell’s (1996) 
classification; and MarketValue/NetAssets is the market-to-book ratio, where MarketValue is 
computed as the market value of equity plus total liabilities. MarketValue is instrumented by 
the three-year lagged sales growth; R&D-to-sales is research and development expenses 
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deflated by Sales, where Sales is total sales; αi, and µt refer to firm- and time- fixed effects, 
respectively; i and t are subscripts denoting firm and time, respectively. 
Opler et al. (1999) extend their original model by considering the implications of 
financing hierarchy theory on cash holdings. Although this theory is based on the assumption 
of the absence of an optimal level of cash, it recognizes that information asymmetry often 
makes external funds so expensive that firms prefer retaining high cash holdings. That is, 
financial management decisions such as borrowing, investing, and paying dividends seem to 
directly influence changes in cash holdings. An extensive form of the model of Opler et 
al. (1999) takes into account financing hierarchy theory by integrating additional variables, 
including capital expenditures, leverage, and dividend payout. This extensive model is 
presented as the following OLS regression  
Ln(Cash/NetAssets)i,t=β0+β1Ln(RealNetAssets)i,t+β2CashFlow/NetAssetsi,t+β3NWC/NetAsse
ti,t        
                              +β4STD CFi+β5MarketValue/NetAssetsi,t+β6R&D-to-salesi,t 
                              +β7Leveragei,t +β8CAPEXi,t/NetAssetsi,t+β9Dividummyi,t 
                               +β10Regulatedummyi,t  +  Industrydum +αi+εi,t ,                      (Eq.(2)) 
where Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of total assets; CAPEX is capital 
expenditure; Dividummy is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm pays dividends, 
and zero otherwise; and Regulatedummy is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm 
belongs to a regulated industry, and zero otherwise;12 Industrydum denotes industry dummy 
variables, following Campbell’s (1996) classification; αi refers to firm fixed effects. 
An alternative measure of excess cash is given by Harford (1999), who estimates the 
optimal level of cash using firm characteristics and time-series changes in funding demand. 
                                                             
12 Regulated industries comprise sectors such as railroads (SIC code 4011), trucking (SIC codes 4210, 
4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecommunications (SIC codes 4812, 4813). 
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His model is based on the view that managers are more inclined to hold large cash reserves as 
buffer stock against future cash flow fluctuations and unexpected losses, thus reducing the 
likelihood of financial distress. In the right-hand side of the cash model, the author therefore 
introduces proxies for the degree of information asymmetry (firm size), industry risk (cash 
flow volatility), and future liquidity shocks (changes in cash flow over the next two years). 
However, the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) assumes that high levels of cash 
holdings enable self-interested managers to be insulated from monitoring by external capital 
providers. That is, cash reserves can be easily diverted to finance value-decreasing projects, 
especially in firms with relatively few investment opportunities. In consideration of this 
hypothesis, the model also encompasses the effects of free cash flow (cash flow net of 
investment) and investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio). The model specification 
suggested by Harford (1999) is 
Cashi,t/Salesi,t=β0+β1NetCFO/Salesi,t+β2∆NetCFO/Salesi,t+1+β3∆ NetCFO/Salesi,t+2 
+β4MB i,t-1+β5CFOVari+β6Ln(MV)i,t-1+Industrydumi+αi+εi,t ,                      (Eq.(3)) 
where Cash is cash and marketable securities; NetCFO is operating cash flow net of 
investments; MB is the market-to-book value of assets; CFOVar is the coefficient of variation 
of cash flow to net assets; and Ln(MV) is a proxy for firm size, computed as the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the firm in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the 
French consumer price index series. Industrydum denotes industry dummy variables 
following Campbell’s (1996) classification, αi refers to firm fixed effects, and i and t are 
subscripts denoting firm and time, respectively.  
d. Model specification 
The value of cash holdings reflects how cash balances influence investors’ valuation 
of the expected cash flows (Faulkender and Wang (2006); Pinkowitz et al. (2006)). To 
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estimate the value of excess cash, we employ Fama and French’s (1998) model linking firm 
value to some of its financial characteristics. This model includes financial variables that 
predominantly affect investors’ expectations of future cash flows, namely, past and future 
changes as well as current levels of earnings, R&D expenses, dividends, and interest 
expenses. The model also includes past and future changes in net assets along with future 
changes in market value as determinants of firm value.  
Following Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we modify 
the model of Fama and French (1998) by breaking out the total assets variable into cash and 
non-cash components.13 Thus modified, the model considers the contribution of excess cash 
to firm value, which reflects the market value of an additional euro of excess cash. The value 
of cash holdings is deemed to be particularly affected by the presence of financial constraints. 
In this respect, Faulkender and Wang (2006) explain that financially constrained firms are 
often restricted to available internal funds when undertaking profitable projects, which make 
cash reserves even more valuable to them. We hence supplement the modified model of Fama 
and French (1998) with the interaction between excess cash and a proxy for financial 
constraints. 
Consistent with theoretical analysis, the value of cash holdings can be affected by the 
corporate governance quality of CMS firms. To test the effects of the separation of control 
and cash-flow rights on the value of excess cash, we estimate the following model 
specification using fixed effects 
Vi,t=β0+β1ExCashi,t+β2Wedgei,t*ExCashi,t+β3Wedgei,t+β4ExCashi,t*FCi,t+β5Earningsi,t 
+β6∆Earningsi,t+β7∆Earningsi,t+1+β8R&Di,t+β9∆R&Di,t+β10∆R&Di,t+1+β11Dividendsi,t 
                                                             
13 This approach is also adopted by many other studies on the value of cash holdings, including those 
of Drobetz et al. (2010) and Frésard and Salva (2010). 
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+β12∆Dividendsi,t+β13∆Dividendsi,t+1+β14Interesti,t+β15∆Interesti,t+β16∆Interesti,t+1+β17∆Vi,
t+1 + β18 ∆NetAssetsi,t+ β19 ∆NetAssetsi,t+1+αi,+µt +εi,t ,                       (Eq. (4)) 
where V is the market value of the firm. V is computed as the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total debt. Earnings is earnings before interest and extraordinary items (after 
depreciation and taxes) deflated by NetAssets;14 R&D is R&D expenses deflated by 
NetAssets; Dividends is common dividends deflated by NetAssets; ∆Xt is the change in 
variable X from year t-1 to year t, and ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year 
t+1. ExCash is excess cash holdings, computed as the residuals of models predicting the 
normal level of cash holdings. FC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
financially constrained, and zero otherwise. A firm is financially constrained (unconstrained) 
when its payout ratio equals (differs from) zero. Wedge is a dummy that equals one if the 
control–ownership wedge is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. The control–
ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO - UCF)/UCO, where UCF (UCO) is the 
ultimate cash-flow (control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. αi, and µt refer to 
firm- and time- fixed effects, respectively.15 i and t are subscripts denoting firm and time, 
respectively. The description of variables used in the analysis is portrayed in the Appendix. 
The coefficient of the interaction term β2 estimates the effect the control-ownership 
wedge on the market value of excess cash. Consistent with our first hypothesis, H1, this 
coefficient should be negative, provided that a higher control–ownership wedge adversely 
affects investors’ valuation of cash holdings in CMS firms. To test hypotheses H2 and H3, we 
rerun our model specification (4) according to whether or not boards of directors are 
                                                             
14 See, e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
15 The results (not reported here) remain qualitatively unchanged when we use pooled ordinary least 
squares with a clustering effect at the firm level as an alternative estimation method. Results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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considered independent. The coefficient β2 is expected to be lower, in absolute value, for 
firms where boards have a larger proportion of independent directors (H2) and for those with 
separate chair and CEO positions (H3). 
5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Not surprisingly, statistics on ownership structure illustrate that control in French firms is 
often concentrated, with a mean (median) of UCO of 51.08% (52.77%), while the mean 
(median) value of UCF is only 41.50% (40.00%). Accordingly, the control–ownership wedge, 
appears to be relatively high, with a mean (median) value of 20.72% (17.05%), suggesting 
that the sample firms are predominantly controlled by shareholders with substantial control-
ownership wedge. As for the cash variable ExCash, the mean and median values amount to, 
respectively, 7.72% and 4.16% of net assets, indicating that French firms exhibit relatively 
important levels of excess cash holdings. Frésard and Silva (2010), for instance, show that 
excess cash holdings represent, on average, a fraction of only 2.9% of net assets held by non-
U.S. firms that cross-list in the U.S. 
6. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we first report the results of predicting the normal level of cash 
holdings. We next present the results of the estimation of the effects of the control−ownership 
wedge on the value of excess cash. We finally explore such effects in light of the board of 
directors’ independence. 
a. Predicting the normal level of cash holdings 
We estimate the normal level of cash holdings to obtain excess cash. Table 3 reports 
the results of the models predicting normal levels of cash holdings. The estimation of the 
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reduced ((Eq. (1)) and the extended form (Eq. (2)) of the model of Opler et al. (1999) is 
presented in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A (Table 3), respectively.  
We note that introducing market-to-book ratio in the models of Opler et al. (1999) 
may induce an endogeneity problem since the level of cash can, in turn, determine the 
importance of firms’ investment opportunities. Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
we employ an instrumental variable approach by using the three-year lagged sales growth in 
the model of Opler et al. (1999) as an instrument for the market-to-book ratio.16The first-stage 
estimation of the reduced model consistently shows a strong statistically positive effect of the 
instrument −three-year sales growth− on the market-to-book ratio. In the second-stage, results 
reassuringly show that instrumented investment opportunities have a significant positive 
effect on cash holdings. Considering the extended form of Opler et al.’s (1999) model, we 
find that the level of cash increases with cash flow, standard deviation of cash flow and R&D 
expenses while it decreases with firm size, net working capital, leverage, capital expenditure 
and dividends. The effects of explanatory variables are qualitatively the same when we 
estimate the reduced form of the model. These results are similar to those of previous studies 
focusing on corporate cash holdings (Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003) and Harford et 
al. (2008), among others). 
We also use the predictive model of Harford (1999) as an alternative approach to 
estimate the level of excess cash. The corresponding results are displayed in Panel B of 
Table 3. We particularly notice that corporate cash holdings increase significantly with 
present and future net operating cash flow, in accordance with the findings of Harford (1999). 
We also report that firms hold more cash when they have higher growth opportunities and 
when they are smaller, which corroborates the results from Opler et al.’s (1999) model 
                                                             
16 Drobtz et al. (2010) and Frésard and Salva (2010) adopt a similar approach.  
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estimation (Table 3, Panel A). Overall, the findings indicate that predictive models used to 
obtain excess cash estimates are statistically robust.  
b. Effects of the control–ownership wedge on the value of excess cash 
In what follows, we investigate how the presence of controlling shareholders with 
control rights in excess of cash-flow rights affects cash valuation. Given the importance of 
agency costs induced by the control–ownership wedge, one may expect that investors assign a 
lower value to excess cash held by CMS firms. Table 4 reports the results from the fixed 
effect estimation of the model specified in Eq. (4) using excess cash as residuals of the 
reduced form (Eq. (1)) and extended form (Eq. (2)) of the model of Opler et al. (1999), as 
well as Harford’s (1999) cash model (Eq. (3)). 
Taken alone, the effect of excess cash on firm value is strongly positive and 
statistically significant across all regressions, with a coefficient β1 of 1.328, 1.307, and 2.320 
for models (1), (2), and (3), respectively. This finding suggests that, at low levels of control–
ownership wedge (Wedge = 0), excess cash positively contributes to firm value. However, 
when the control–ownership wedge is high (Wedge = 1), excess cash decreases firm value. 
The coefficient β2 of the interaction term ExCash*Wedge amounts to -1.189, -1.137, and -
2.201 in, respectively, models (1), (2), and (3). The estimated coefficient β2 is found to be 
strongly significant at the 1% statistical level across all regressions. In light of this, our 
findings reveal that the contribution of excess cash to firm value declines significantly with 
greater separation of control and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder, which is 
consistent with Masulis et al. (2009) for the US dual-class companies. 
In terms of economic magnitude, the value of an additional euro of excess cash           
–estimated from Opler et al.’s (1999) reduced form model (Eq. (1))− falls, on average, from 
1.328 to 0.139 euro (= 1.328 - 1.189) when control–ownership wedge increases from low to 
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high levels. Such decline is from 1.307 to 0.170 euro (= 1.307 - 1.137) when excess cash is 
derived from the extended form (Eq. (2)) of Opler et al. (1999) model for cash holdings. Thus, 
a high control–ownership wedge lowers the value of the marginal euro of excess cash by 
more than 80%.17 Using Harford’s (1999) model (Eq. (3)), this decline reaches the level of 
95%, since we find that the value of an additional euro of cash falls from 2.320 to 0.118 (= 
2.320 - 2.202) when the control–ownership wedge becomes relatively important. 
Control variables are found to have significant effects on firm value. Thus, the results 
of Table 4 show that variables measuring current levels and future changes of earnings, R&D 
expenses, and dividend payout exhibit positive coefficients, suggesting that better 
profitability, higher R&D expenses, and more important distributions to shareholders 
contribute to enhance firm value. The variable measuring future changes in firm value, ∆Vt+1, 
captures unexpected effects of omitted variables and consistently exhibits a negative 
coefficient estimate, as suggested by Fama and French (1998). In line with the findings of 
these authors, past and future growth rate in net assets is found to have a positive effect on 
firm value. Taken together, these findings are consistent with those of previous studies related 
to the value of cash holdings (e.g., Drobetz et al. (2010); and Haw et al. (2011)). 
Empirical results reported in Table 4 also suggest that financial constraints make 
excess cash more valuable to investors, as argued by Faulkender and Wang (2006). The 
coefficient of the interaction term ExCash*FC is, in fact, positive and statistically significant 
in models (1) and (2). 
It is also noteworthy that, similar to related studies, the explanatory power of our 
model specification is strong across all regressions of Table 4, as shown by the relatively high 
                                                             
17 This decline is 87% [(1.328 - 0.139)/1.328] for model (1) and 89.5% [(1.307 - 0.170)/1.307] 
for model (2) (Table 4). 
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R-squared value (within), which is 27.48%, 26.87%, and 29.86% for, respectively, models 
(1), (2), and (3).18  
In sum, results from the different estimations reported in Table 4 are in favor of our 
first hypothesis, H1, suggesting that the value of cash holdings decreases with the separation 
of control and cash-flow rights. Investors seem to be increasingly concerned about the 
availability of large cash holdings at the free disposal of entrenched controlling shareholders. 
c. Control–ownership wedge, independent directors, and value of excess cash  
This section focuses on testing how the presence of independent directors influences 
the value of excess cash, depending on the importance of the control–ownership wedge. To 
this end, we divide our sample in two subgroups according to whether the proportion of 
independent board members is below (Independent boards=0) or above (Independent 
boards=1) the sample median. We then examine the effects of the control–ownership wedge 
and independent directors on the value of excess cash and perform a Chow-test of difference 
to examine whether (ExCash + ExCash*Wedge) is significantly different between the two 
subgroups. We expect that a greater presence of independent directors should reduce the 
discount in the value of cash of CMS firms. The empirical results are reported in Table 5. 
Our results reported in Table 4 show that a greater separation of control and cash-flow 
rights induces more discount in the value of excess cash. The results reported in Table 5 
indicate that this value discount is less pronounced for firms with more independent directors 
sitting on their boards. The estimation of model (1) of Table 5 yields a coefficient β2 of the 
                                                             
18 The number of observations varies from one regression to another depending on data 
availability and the number of observations with positive excess cash. 
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interaction term ExCash*Wedge of -0.922 (with t-statistic = -2.90) for the subgroup of firms 
with a high proportion of independent directors on the board (Independent boards=1); such 
coefficient is -1.352 (with t-statistic = -2.75) for the subgroup of firms with a low proportion 
of independent members (Independent boards=0). In terms of economic magnitude, the value 
of an additional euro of excess cash is 0.820 euro (= 1.742 - 0.922) in independent-board 
firms with a high control–ownership wedge. This value of cash declines to 0.270 euro 
(= 1.622 - 1.352) when boards include a low number of independent members. The Chow test 
of comparison for the sum ExCash + ExCash*Wedge supports the statistically significant 
difference –at the 1% level– in the value of cash between the two subgroups of independent 
and non-independent boards. 
Additionally, the estimation of model (2) of Table 5 shows that the coefficient β2 is 
negative across the two sub-samples, but is larger –in absolute value– for boards with few 
independent members compared to those with many independent directors (a coefficient of 
-1.270 versus -0.885). As far as the economic magnitude is concerned, investors of firms 
featuring an important control–ownership wedge tend to value a marginal euro of excess cash 
to 0.823 euro (= 1.708 - 0.885) when boards contain a large number of independent members, 
whereas this value falls to only 0.320 (= 1.590 - 1.270) euro when the board is less 
independent. Results of the Chow-test show that the difference in the value of excess cash 
across the two sub-samples is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The results of the estimation of model (3) of Table 5 are closely akin to those derived 
from models (1) and (2). As such, we find that an additional euro of excess cash lowers firm 
value by 0.671 euro (= 2.097 - 2.768) when few independent directors sit on the board of a 
CMS firm with a large control–ownership wedge. In the alternative case of the high presence 
of independent directors, the value of a marginal euro of excess cash increases to 1.550 euro 
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(= 3.938 - 2.388). The difference in the value of excess cash between the two subgroups is 
again statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Taken together, our results highlight the crucial role of independent directors in 
limiting the discount in the value of excess cash, particularly when the control rights of 
controlling shareholders substantially exceed their cash-flow rights. Overall, we find support 
for the second hypothesis, H2, suggesting that high-quality monitoring by independent 
directors reduces the likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders in CMS firms. 
d. Control–ownership wedge, separation of CEO and chair positions, and value 
of excess cash 
To capture the effect of separating CEO and board chair positions on cash valuation, 
we split our sample according to whether or not the CEO of the firm is also the chair of the 
board of directors ((CEO duality=1) or (CEO duality=0). The estimation results of models (1), 
(2), and (3) are reported in Table 6. Overall, the separation of CEO and chair positions is 
found to be associated with better valuation of excess cash compared to when these positions 
are held by the same person. Hence, the contribution of excess cash to firm value is higher in 
the absence of a leadership structure centered around only one person. In instances of a high 
control–ownership wedge, (Wedge = 1), the coefficient β2 is negative, -2.466 (with t-statistic 
= -3.92), for firms with CEO duality, while this coefficient is only -0.646 (with t-statistic = -
2.76) in cases of non-CEO duality. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The decline in the value of excess cash arising from important control−ownership 
wedge seems to be accentuated when the CEO of the firm is also the chairperson of the board. 
With respect to economic magnitude, we find that an additional euro of cash reduces firm 
value by 0.534 euro (= 1.932 - 2.466) in the sub-sample of firms where a large control–
ownership wedge is coupled with a dual leadership structure. Separating CEO and chair 
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positions, however, largely improves the value of one marginal euro of excess cash to 1.713 
euro (= 2.359 - 0.646). This difference in the value of excess cash between dual and non-dual 
leadership firms is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The results of models (2) and (3) of Table 6 offer a similar picture. When the control–
ownership wedge is substantial, the value of an additional euro of excess cash is 1.319 euro 
(=1.861-0.542) for model (2) and 0.522 euro (= 2.474 - 1.952) for model (3) in the absence of 
CEO duality. Looking at firms with CEO duality, results of model (2) and model (3) of 
Table 6 show that one marginal euro of excess cash decreases firm value by, respectively, 
0.484 euro (= 1.410 - 1.894) and 0.212 euro (= 1.984 - 2.196). The difference in the value of 
excess cash between the two subgroups is significant at the 5% statistical level. These results 
suggest that the adverse effect of the control−ownership wedge on the value of excess cash is 
magnified by the combination of the CEO and chair positions.  The results provide empirical 
evidence that the magnitude of agency costs related to dual leadership structure negatively 
affects the valuation of excess cash held by CMS firms. The separation of CEO and chair 
positions seems, however, to limit such decline in the value of excess cash, which 
corroborates our third hypothesis, H3. In summary, the absence of CEO duality appears to 
constrain the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders, particularly those wielding 
excessive control rights relative to cash-flow rights. 
7. Conclusion 
The valuation of corporate excess cash is based on how investors expect this cash to 
be used. Empirical evidence suggests that cash holdings are more valuable in firms with 
profitable growth opportunities, particularly when facing severe financial constraints 
(Faulkender and Wang (2006)). Nonetheless, increasing levels of cash holdings lead to a 
discount in firm value when investors perceive that excess cash is likely to be converted into 
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private benefits. Based on this argument, the present research examines how investors value 
excess cash held by CMS firms. 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this study 
suggest that investors are more concerned about the use of excess cash when controlling 
shareholders have a greater ability to entrench themselves. More specifically, investors tend to 
reduce the value of excess cash by more than 80% in the case of CMS firms featuring high 
separation of control and cash-flow rights.  
Empirical findings show that the discount in the value of excess cash in CMS firms is 
less pronounced when boards are more independent. Besides, the separation of CEO and chair 
positions appears to reinforce board effectiveness in the eyes of investors, who assign higher 
value to the excess cash of non-dual leadership CMS firms.  
Overall, the present research emphasizes the relevance of board independence in 
reducing controlling shareholders’ impetus for private benefits consumption. Such a 
disciplinary role of boards of directors is basically reflected in better market valuation of 
corporate cash holdings. Although compelling, the evidence in favor of the board of directors’ 
effectiveness is still underexplored in a concentrated ownership setting where the interference 
of controlling shareholders in the selection and the compensation of directors may jeopardize 
the board’s monitoring role.  
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Appendix. Variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
ExCash Excess cash holdings, computed as the residuals of models predicting the 
normal level of cash holdings. 
Wedge Dummy variable that equals one if the control-ownership wedge is above the 
sample median, and zero otherwise. Control-ownership wedge is measured as 
the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO where UCF (UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow 
(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. 
Independent 
boards 
Dummy variable that equals one if the proportion of independent directors on 
the board is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
CEO duality Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise.   
V Market value of the ﬁrm. It is computed as the market value of equity plus 
book value of total debt. 
Cash Cash and marketable securities. 
NetAssets Non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash 
and marketable securities. 
Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by 
NetAssets. 
R&D Research and Development expenses deflated by NetAssets. 
Interest Interests on debts deflated by NetAssets. 
Dividends Common dividends deflated by NetAssets. 
FC Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is financially constrained, and 
zero otherwise. A firm is financially constrained (unconstrained) when its 
payout ratio equals (differs from) zero. 
Ln(realNetAssets) Firm size. It is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets minus 
cash and marketable securities in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the 
French consumer price index (CPI) series. 
CashFlow Cash flow. It is computed as operating income minus interest and taxes. 
NWC Net working capital. It is computed as current assets minus current liabilities 
minus cash. 
STD CF  Standard deviation of cash flows. It is computed as industry average of prior 
5 year standard deviation of cash flow to net assets, where industry is defined 
according to Campbell’s (1996) industry classification. 
MarketValue/ 
NetAssets 
Market-to-book ratio where MarketValue is market value computed as 
market value of equity plus total liabilities. It is instrumented by Three-year 
Sales Growth computed as three-year lagged sales growth. 
Sales Total sales. 
R&D-to-sales Research and development expenses deflated by Sales. 
Leverage Total debt scaled by book value of total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure. 
Dividummy Dummy that equals one when a firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise. 
Regulatedummy Dummy that equals one when a firm belongs to a regulated industry, and zero 
otherwise. 
NetCFO Operating cash flow net of investments. 
MB Market-to-book value of assets. 
CFOVar Coefficient of variation of cash flow to net assets. 
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Ln(MV) Firm size. It is computed as the natural logarithm of the market value of the 
firm in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French consumer price 
index (CPI) series.  
∆Xt (∆Xt+1) Change in variable X from year t-1 (t) to year t (t+1). 
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Table 1. Procedure of sample selection 
This table illustrates the procedure of sample selection. We start with a total of 3,831 publicly listed French firms 
on the Euronext over the period from 2002 to 2007. We discard firms belonging to financial and utilities 
industries and those with missing financial and governance data. After excluding observations with negative 
excess cash (using excess cash as residual from the extended form of the model of Opler et al.’s (1999) (Eq.(2)), 
we are left with 1,901 observations of 398 firms. 
 
Description  Number of observations 
Publicly listed French firms on the Euronext 3,831 
Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) (592) 
Utilities (SIC 4900-4999) (80) 
Observations with missing financial data            (502) 
Observations with missing ownership data            (163) 
Observations with negative excess cash            (593) 
Final sample 1,901 
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics        
This table provides descriptive statistics of the sample of firms with positive excess cash. Control-
ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO where UCF (UCO) is the ultimate cash-
flow (control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. A fraction of 21.46% of the sampled firms 
does not exhibit a separation of control and cash-flow rights. ExCash is excess cash holdings. It is the 
residual of Eq. (2) in Table 3. V is market value of the ﬁrm. It is computed as the market value of 
equity plus book value of total debt. NetAssets is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of 
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NetAssets. R&D is research and 
development expense deflated by NetAssets. Interest is interest expense deflated by NetAssets. 
Dividends is common dividends deflated by NetAssets. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from year t-1 to 
year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1.  
Variable  
25th 
percentile Mean Median 
75th 
percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
Ownership structure 
UCF (%) 20.58 41.50 40.00 60.68 25.09 
UCO (%) 31.12 51.08 52.77 70.84 25.04 
(UCO-UCF)/UCO (%) 
 
1.09 20.72 17.05 31.55 21.55 
Firm Characteristics 
ExCash 0.0201 0.0772 0.0416 0.0827 0.1098 
Vt 1.1216 1.8254 1.4128 1.9308 1.4062 
Earningst 0.0108 0.0255 0.0370 0.0711 0.12701 
∆Earnings t -0.0075 0.0153 0.0067 0.0241 0.12036 
∆Earnings t+1 -0.0138 0.0097 0.0054 0.0251 0.1106 
∆NetAssets t -0.0357 0.0506 -0.0357 -0.0357 -0.0357 
∆NetAssets t+1 -0.0281 0.1121 -0.0281 -0.0281 -0.0281 
R&Dt 0.0000 0.0169 0.0000 0.0064 0.0493 
∆R&D t 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0151 
∆R&D t+1 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0161 
Interestt 0.0057 0.0136 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 
∆Interest t -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 
∆Interest t+1 -0.0019 0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 
Dividends 0.0000 0.0137 0.0083 0.0176 0.0197 
∆Dividendst 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆Dividends t+1 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆V t+1 -0.1627 0.1380 -0.1627 -0.1627 -0.1627 
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Table 3. Results of regressions predicting the normal level of cash holdings    
This table reports the regression results for the level of cash holdings. In Panel A, we estimate the reduced form 
(Eq.(1)) and the extended form (Eq.(2)) of Opler et al.’s  (1999) model. Dependent variable for Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) 
is the level of cash. It is measured as the natural logarithm of cash-to-net assets (Ln(Cash/NetAssets)). Cash is cash 
and marketable securities. NetAssets is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash 
and marketable securities. The regressors include Ln(realNetAssets) which proxies for firm size. It is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets minus cash and marketable securities in 2007 euros, adjusted for 
inflation using the French consumer price index (CPI) series; CashFlow/Net Assets is cash flow computed as 
operating income minus interest and taxes, deflated by NetAssets; NWC/NetAssets is net working capital computed 
as current assets minus current liabilities minus cash, deflated by NetAssets; STD CF  is standard deviation of cash 
flow computed as industry average of prior 5 year standard deviation of cash flow to net assets, where industry is 
defined according to Campbell’s (1996) industry classification; MarketValue/NetAssets is market-to-book ratio 
where MarketValue is market value computed as market value of equity plus total liabilities. R&D-to-sales is 
research and development expenses deflated by Sales, where Sales is total sales; Leverage is total debt scaled by 
book value of total assets; CAPEX/NetAssets is capital expenditure, deflated by NetAssets; Dividummy is a dummy 
that equals one when a firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise. Regulatedummy is a dummy that equals one when 
a firm belongs to a regulated industry, and zero otherwise. Eq (1) is estimated as a fixed effect panel. Eq (2) is 
estimated as OLS regression with industry dummies and robust standard errors. Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated using 
an instrumental variable approach with three-year lagged sales growth (Three-year Sales Growth) as an instrument 
for MarketValue/NetAssets. The results of the first stage of the instrumental variable model (MarketValue/NetAssets 
as dependent variable) are reported in the right side of Panel A. In panel B, we estimate the model of 
Harford (1999) (Eq. (3)) as OLS regression with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The Dependent 
variable is cash-to-sale ratio (Cash/Sales). The regressors include NetCFO/Salesi,t, ∆NetCFO/Sales i,t+1, 
∆NetCFO/Sales i,t+2, where NetCFO is operating cash flow net of investments; MBi,t-1 , where MB is the market-to-
book value of assets; CFOVari is the coefficient of variation of cash flow to net assets; Ln(MV)i,t-1, where Ln(MV) 
is firm size, computed as the natural logarithm of market value in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the 
French consumer price index (CPI) series. All models include year dummies. a, b and c denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the 
estimated coefficients. 
Panel A: Model of Opler et al. (1999)  
 Reduced form Extended form First-stage  
Variable Eq.(1) Eq.(2)  
Ln(realNetAssets) -0.3773 (-10.64)a -0.3774 (-10.63)a Ln(realNetAssets) -1.1191   (-18.72)a   
CashFlow/NetAssets 0.5845 (6.43)a 0.6762 (6.72)a CashFlow/ 
NetAssets 1.7871 (9.61)
a NWC/NetAssets -0.0909 (-3.12)a -0.1126 (-3.62)a 
STD CF 0.5052 (4.80)a 0.4649 (4.37)a NWC/NetAssets -0.9534   (-19.22)a          
MarketValue/NetAssets 0.0535 (3.23)a 0.0507 (3.06)a STD CF 0.6547   (3.41)a      
R&D-to-sales 2.4133 (8.24)a 2.5172 (8.53)a Three-year Sales 
Growth 0.0203 (29.58)
a Leverage - - -0.2090 (-2.69)a 
CAPEX/NetAssets - - -1.0611 (-3.23)a R&D-to-sales    1.9233    (3.22)a      
Dividummy - - -0.1412 (-2.11)a Intercept 22.3168 (18.36) a 
Regulatedummy - - -0.1067 (-0.14)    
Intercept 15.375  (21.13)a 1.1518 (2.63)a         
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes  No 
Nb.observations 2,657 2,657  Nb.observations                                        2,657 
R-squared 18.48% 19.01%  R-squared                                         63.61%
     
Panel B: Model of Harford (1999)    
Variable                                          Eq.(3)    
NetCFO/Salesi,t 1.6841 (11.61)a    
∆NetCFO/Sales i,t+1 1.1635 (11.61)a    
∆ NetCFO/Sales i,t+2 0.6323 (3.66)a     
MBi,t-1 0.1090 (4.38)a    
CFOVari -0.0185 (-0.42)    
Ln(MV)i,t-1 -1.3458 (-18.68)a    
Intercept 22.316           (18.36)a    
Year dummies Yes    
Industry dummies Yes    
Nb.observations 2,040    
R-squared 14.77 %    
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Table 4. Control-ownership wedge and value of excess cash 
This table reports results of fixed effect regressions of the control-ownership wedge on the value of excess cash. 
The sample consists of firms with positive excess cash. The dependent variable in all models is the market value 
of the ﬁrm, denoted as Vt. It is computed as the market value of equity plus book value of total debt. NetAssets is 
non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Earnings 
is earnings before interest and extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NetAssets. R&D is 
research and development expense deflated by NetAssets. Interest is interest expense deflated by NetAssets. 
Dividends is common dividends deflated by NetAssets. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t. 
∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1. FC is a dummy that equals one if the firm is financially 
constrained, and zero otherwise. A firm is financially constrained (unconstrained) when its payout ratio equals 
(differs from) zero. ExCash is excess cash holdings. Models (1), (2) and (3) use ExCash as the residual of, 
respectively, the reduced form of model of Opler et al., (1999), the extended form of model of Opler et al., 
(1999), and the model of Harford (1999). Wedge is a dummy that equals one if the control-ownership wedge is 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Control-ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO-
UCF)/UCO where UCF (UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow (control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. a, 
b and c  denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
ExCasht 1.3287    (4.03)a 1.3078    (3.99)a 2.3204      (2.71)a     
ExCasht*Wedget -1.1897  (-3.72)a -1.1374    (-3.59)a -2.2012 (-2.64)a 
Wedget -0.1839    (-1.47) -0.1819    (-1.46) 0.0592 (0.32) 
ExCasht*FCt 1.4948    (3.72)a 1.4561    (3.64)a 0.1383 (0.66) 
Earningst 4.1800    (10.70)a 4.1097    (10.47)a 4.4209 (8.26)a 
∆Earningst -0.3572   (-1.51) -0.3762    (-1.58) -0.7982 (-2.43)b 
∆Earningst+1 2.4830    (9.58)a 2.4151    (9.33)a 2.6076 (7.19)a 
∆NetAssetst 0.3192    (3.62)a 0.3238    (3.68)a 0.1549 (1.35) 
∆NetAssetst+1 0.2231   (5.74)a 0.2261    (5.82)a 0.3329 (4.85)a 
R&Dt 3.8065    (3.55)a 3.8539    (3.61)a 11.5409 (9.30)a 
∆R&Dt -0.7701   (-0.76) -0.7531     (-0.74) -0.5874 (-0.52) 
∆R&Dt+1 2.4991    (3.10)a 2.4977    (3.10)a 5.5758 (5.90)a 
Interestt 13.4777    (4.39)a 13.2689    (4.32)a 20.0441 (5.01)a 
∆Interest t -2.7850   (-1.02) -2.9819    (-1.10) -1.1483 (-0.32) 
∆Interest t+1 9.9824   (4.24)a 9.5582    (4.08)a 11.9612 (4.19)a 
Dividends 5.6837    (3.41)a 5.4235    (3.23)a -0.8108 (-0.26) 
∆Dividendst -2.2431    (-2.59)b -2.1709    (-2.50)b 4.0861 (1.51) 
∆Dividendst+1 1.1191  (1.23) 0.9885    (1.08) 2.4367 (1.60) 
∆Vt+1 -0.1847    (-10.13)a -0.1874    (-10.29)a -0.1740 (-6.98)a 
Intercept 1.2517   (11.42)a 1.2603    (11.53)a 0.9278 (8.88)a 
Nb.observations 1,888 1,901 1,190 
R-squared 27.48% 26.87% 29.86% 
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             Table 5. Control-ownership wedge, independent directors and value of excess cash  
This table reports results of fixed effect regressions of the control-ownership wedge on the value of excess cash depending on board independence. The sample consists 
of firms with positive excess cash. Dependent variable is the market value of the ﬁrm, denoted as Vt. It is computed as the market value of equity plus book value of total 
debt. NetAssets is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NetAssets. R&D is research and development expense deflated by NetAssets. Interest is interest expense 
deflated by NetAssets. Dividends is common dividends deflated by NetAssets. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X 
from year t to year t+1. FC is a dummy that equals one if the firm is financially constrained, and zero otherwise. A firm is financially constrained (unconstrained) when 
its payout ratio equals (differs from) zero. ExCash is excess cash holdings. Models (1), (2) and (3) use ExCash as the residual of, respectively, Eq.(1), Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) 
in Table 3. Wedge is a dummy that equals one if the control-ownership wedge is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Control-ownership wedge is measured as 
the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO where UCF (UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow (control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Independent boards is a dummy that 
equals one if the proportion of independent directors on the board is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses next to the 
estimated coefficients. The Chow-test tests whether the sum ExCasht+ExCasht*Wedget is significantly different between groups of independent and non-independent 
boards. Chi-square statistics ( χ2) with one degree of freedom are reported. a, b and c denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Independent boards Independent boards Independent boards 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
ExCasht 1.6220 (3.29)a 1.7425 (4.72)a 1.5909 (3.27)a 1.7086 (4.65)a 2.0977 (2.28)b 3.9380 (3.39)a 
ExCasht*Wedget -1.3526 (-2.75)a -0.9224 (-2.90)a -1.2704 (-2.62)a -0.8850 (-2.80)a -2.7682 (-3.19)a -2.3884 (-2.19)b 
Wedget -0.2945 (-1.20) 0.0252 (0.22) -0.2913 (-1.20) 0.0267 (0.24) 0.0832 (0.14) -0.0923 (-0.17) 
ExCasht*FCt 1.4480 (2.45)b -0.8481 (-1.77)c 1.4562 (2.50)b -0.8782 (-1.84)c 0.0722 (0.72) 0.0869 (0.64) 
Earningst 3.6710 (6.77)a 4.3201 (8.51)a 3.4408 (6.28)a 4.3278 (8.53)a 2.9429 (3.89)a 1.0897 (2.48)b 
∆Earnings t -0.8367 (-2.34)b -0.3937 (-1.36) -0.8242 (-2.30)b -0.3856 (-1.33) 0.2927 (0.54) 0.3271 (1.09) 
∆Earnings t+1 2.3587 (7.48)a 2.2589 (6.90)a 2.2599 (7.24)a 2.2338 (6.84)a 2.4930 (4.90)a 2.4202 (6.78)a 
∆NetAssets t 0.3011 (2.82)a 0.2317 (2.07)b 0.3121 (2.97)a 0.2298 (2.05)b 0.0310 (0.18) 0.2792 (1.93)c 
∆NetAssets t+1 0.0917 (2.08)b 0.6277 (10.30)a 0.0937 (2.16)b 0.6341 (10.42)a 0.3346 (5.05)a 0.2753 (3.43)a 
R&Dt 2.9857 (1.81)c 7.5561 (5.99)a 2.9061 (1.79)c 7.6879 (6.12)a 16.7869 (10.42)a 12.2460 (7.04)a 
∆R&D t -0.6175 (-0.48) -1.3907 (-1.16) -0.6605 (-0.51) -1.2911 (-1.08) 6.6392 (4.45)a -7.5459 (-5.46)a 
∆R&D t+1 3.4074 (2.86)a 1.0966 (1.42) 3.2687 (2.80)a 1.1050 (1.43) 1.5948 (1.46) 2.3396 (3.14)a 
Interestt 4.3857 (1.28) 16.9501 (5.12)a 4.9206 (1.12) 16.7059 (5.05)a 10.9857 (2.16)b 7.1390 (1.24) 
∆Interest t -6.983 (-1.15) -1.5440 (-0.55) -4.2839 (-1.15) -1.3390 (-0.47) 4.3825 (1.22) 0.5579 (0.10) 
∆Interest t+1 0.0841 (1.92)c 9.8002 (4.16)a 5.8721 (1.63) 9.8031 (4.16)a 7.8844 (2.79)a 0.7848 (0.15) 
Dividends 5.0811 (2.81)a 8.1695 (3.09)a 4.6040 (2.53)b 8.0105 (3.04)a 8.5959 (1.98)c 4.7435 (1.03) 
∆Dividends t -2.1970 (-2.40)b -1.1534 (-0.50) -1.9847 (-2.17)b -1.2391 (-0.54) 1.4537 (0.43) 10.6554 (3.06)a 
∆Dividends t+1 0.8212 (0.90) 3.3567 (1.75)c 0.7118 (0.78) 3.0252 (1.58) 6.4487 (2.86)a 1.5211 (0.83) 
∆V t+1 -0.0986 (-4.10)a -0.4188 (-4.19)a -0.0826 (-4.05)a -0.4271 (-14.58)a -0.2197 (-7.29)a -0.1505 (-8.37)a 
Intercept 1.6665 (8.07)a 0.9109 (8.81)a 1.6843 (8.24)a 0.9144 (8.85)a 0.7198 (3.17)a 1.3061 (8.20)a 
Nb.observations 938 950 943 958 595 595 
R-squared 26.30% 46.49% 25.12% 46.64% 54.14% 42.29% 
Chow-test χ2 (1) = 10.75a χ2 (1) = 9.36a χ2 (1) = 7.55a 
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             Table 6. Control-ownership wedge, separation of CEO and chair positions and value of excess cash 
This table reports results of fixed effect regressions of the control-ownership wedge on the value of excess cash depending on CEO duality. The sample consists of 
firms with positive excess cash. Dependent variable is the market value of the ﬁrm, denoted as Vt .It is computed as the market value of equity plus book value of 
total debt. NetAssets is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NetAssets. R&D is research and development expense deflated by NetAssets. Interest is interest 
expense deflated by NetAssets. Dividends is common dividends deflated by NetAssets. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in 
variable X from year t to year t+1. FC is a dummy that equals one if the firm is financially constrained, and zero otherwise. A firm is financially constrained 
(unconstrained) when its payout ratio equals (differs from) zero. ExCash is excess cash holdings. Models (1), (2) and (3) use ExCash as the residual of, respectively, 
Eq.(1), Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) in Table 3. Wedge is a dummy that equals one if the control-ownership wedge is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Control-
ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO-UCF)/UCO where UCF (UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow (control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. 
CEO duality is a dummy variable that equals one when the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. The Chow-test tests whether the sum ExCasht+ExCasht*Wedget is significantly different between groups of CEO 
duality and non-CEO duality. Chi-square statistics ( χ2) with one degree of freedom are reported. a, b and c denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
CEO duality CEO duality CEO duality 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
ExCasht 2.3598 (7.18)a 1.9316 (3.01)a 1.8611 (6.82)a 1.4104 (2.31)b 2.4741 (3.14)a 1.9847 (1.74)c 
ExCasht*Wedget -0.6469 (-2.76)a -2.4660 (-3.92)a -0.5426 (-2.27)b -1.8945 (-3.17)a -1.9519 (-2.30)b -2.1961 (-2.07)b 
Wedget -0.0787 (-1.35) -0.1039 (-1.23) 0.0422 (0.26) -0.1821 (-1.21) 0.1835 (1.69)c 0.0038 (0.04) 
ExCasht*FCt -0.9110 (-2.18)b 1.6402 (2.95)a -0.9745 (-2.34)b 1.7849 (3.24)a 0.4252 (0.90) 0.2050 (0.38) 
Earningst 1.7443 (5.04)a 5.7682 (8.26)a 1.7868 (5.18)a 5.5587 (7.93)a 1.2133 (1.67)c 2.4779 (5.56)a 
∆Earnings t 0.3177 (1.57) -1.3433 (-3.30)a 0.7971 (1.49) -1.2354 (-3.02)a 0.4283 (1.22) 0.3320 (0.97) 
∆Earnings t+1 1.5413 (6.97)a 3.3190 (7.84)a 1.5082 (6.83)a 3.2522 (7.63)a 0.9086 (2.59)b 3.4906 (8.98)a 
∆NetAssets t 0.0144 (0.13) 0.3241 (2.91)a 0.0154 (0.14) 0.3277 (2.93)a 0.1716 (1.01) 0.0346 (0.25) 
∆NetAssets t+1 0.6029 (8.29)a 0.1226 (2.59)b 0.6256 (8.68)a 0.1253 (2.63)a 0.4985 (4.25)a 0.1828 (3.33)a 
R&Dt 4.1221 (3.31)a 4.1178 (2.72)a 4.0492 (3.24)a 4.1097 (2.71)a 3.0842 (1.42) 12.6020 (7.76)a 
∆R&D t -0.5691 (-0.66) 0.2387 (0.15) -0.7425 (-0.86) 0.1599 (0.10) 2.1262 (1.76)c -3.2440 (-1.92) 
∆R&D t+1 3.2552 (4.22)a 1.7717 (1.09) 3.3579 (4.35)a 1.6834 (1.03) 3.2964 (2.92)a 5.5291 (3.10)a 
Interestt 6.8867 (2.69)a 1.4429 (0.37) 6.4343 (2.57)b 0.9207 (0.24) 9.2922 (2.45)b 8.9038 (1.88)c 
∆Interest t -1.7491 (-0.48) 5.4570 (1.13) -1.9390 (-0.54) 4.6010 (0.95) 9.2102 (1.60) -7.7112 (-1.35) 
∆Interest t+1 6.1327 (2.18)b 10.6418 (3.37)a 5.7950 (2.13)b 10.3069 (3.24)a 16.8245 (3.87)a 7.8817 (2.31)b 
Dividends 11.7595 (4.40)a 0.7156 (0.28) 11.9055 (4.54)a 0.6418 (0.25)a 7.4957 (1.08) 3.9232 (1.07) 
∆Dividends t -2.2208 (-1.17) -0.5179 (-0.47) -2.6183 (-1.40) -0.6353 (-0.57) -3.0987 (-0.96) 6.0509 (1.90)c 
∆Dividends t+1 5.4369 (3.64)a -0.2704 (-0.23) 5.1062 (3.40)a -0.5804 (-0.49) 17.4801 (4.07)a 1.4653 (0.77) 
∆V t+1 -0.3325 (-10.18)a -0.1312 (-5.28)a -0.3493 (-11.60)a -0.1333 (-5.32)a -0.2840 (-5.05)a -0.1579 (-7.68)a 
Intercept 1.4078 (19.14)a 1.3528 (1303)a 1.3511 (8.86)a 1.4570 (9.81)a 1.2177 (7.38)a 1.6601 (8.59)a 
Nb. observations 733 1,155 753 1,148 318 872 
R-squared 49.86% 20.79% 49.77% 20.48% 74.27% 24.80% 
Chow-test χ2 (1) = 5.46b χ2 (1) = 4.86b χ2 (1) = 4.45b 
